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TICKET SCALPING AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW
In Tyson v. Banton, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927) the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland, held
unconstitutional a New York statute requiring that the price
be printed on the face of theater tickets and forbidding the
resale of tickets at more than fifty cents in excess of such price.
Four members of the court dissented: Justices Holmes, Stone,
Sanford and Brandeis. The opinion of the court takes the
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view that theaters are not affected with a public interest, and
that therefore the law-making body may not fix the maximum
amount of the charge for tickets. This view is supported by
the authority of Lord Chief Justice Hale and by the statement
that the price of theater tickets may no more be regulated than
the price of provisions or clothing.
Mr. Justice Sutherland states the issue in such a manner as
to lend support to the result reached in his opinion. But can it
properly be said that the issue is one of price-fixing, when there
was no effort to control the price as such, but only the additional
charge on resale? The control, it is true, is of one element of
price in sale through ticket brokers. And this presents the real
issue of the case. The theater itself having fixed what it must
have regarded as a reasonable price for tickets, does the public
interest justify a prohibition of profit in excess of fifty cents per
ticket by brokers who, in fact, by contract with the theaters, con-
trol a monopoly of the best seats in substantially all the first class
theaters? The reasonableness of the limitation to a fifty cent
profit was apparently not questioned, had the court found that
power existed to impose a limitation.
The record in this case seems to show that ticket brokers in
the borough of Manhattan annually sell about two million tickets,
and have a practical monopoly of the best seats in the first class
theaters. These facts lead to the conclusion that there is a
public interest justifying the regulation of this practice. The
dissent of Mr. Justice Stone is more convincing than the opinion
of the court, and the dissents of Justices Holmes and Sanford
add weight to this conclusion.
While denying legislative power to fix prices for theatrical
performances, Mr. Justice Sutherland recognizes some public in-
terest in the control of the sale of theater tickets. He speaks
approvingly of the case of People v. Thompson, 283 Ill. 87, 119
N. E. 41 (1918) which upheld an ordinance of the city of Chi-
cago requiring that the price of every theater ticket be printed
on its face and forbidding any proprietor or employee of a
theater to receive or enter into any arrangement or agreement to
receive more. Mr. Justice Sutherland speaks of this ordinance
as effective. Possibly he has never sought to purchase theater
tickets in Chicago. Neither the Chicago ordinance nor the New
York statute attempted to fix the price to be charged by the
proprietor. The Chicago ordinance is largely unenforceable be-
cause of the difficulty of proof. The New York statute adopts
an objective and enforceable standard for the effective accom-
plishment of the result aimed at but not achieved by the Chicago
ordinance. The purpose of preventing a confederation of thea-
ter owners and ticket scalpers is the same in both cases, as is
also the purpose of requiring somewhat equal treatment of those
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buying tickets from the theater and of those buying from scalp-
ers who are selling by virtue of contractual relations with the
theater. iMr. Justice Sutherland speaks of the ticket broker as
"a mere appendage of the theater." The essential difference is
that in the New York case the confederation was apparently ad-
mitted in the record, and the theater proprietors receive an
advantage in the certainty of sale of tickets rather than in
increased price of admission. The decision does not point out
why it is proper to forbid direct profit by the theater as in the
Chicago ordinance but improper to control an indirect but sub-
stantially equivalent profit.
The Mr. Justice Sutherland who wrote the ticket scalping
opinion is not the Mr. Justice Sutherland who in the present
term of the Supreme Court wrote the opinion in Euclid r. Awbhr
Realty Company, 47 Sup. Ct. 114. Spealdng for the court in
that case, he said that the power to regulate the erection of
buildings by zoning ordinances "is to be determined, not by an
abstract consideration of the building or the thing considered
apart, but by considering it in connection with the circumstances
and the locality." In the Euclid case he said for the court that
the scope of application of constitutional principles "must ex-
pand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which
are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a
changing world it is impossible that it should be otherwise."
But when applied to the recognized evil of ticket-scalping, the
same constitutional principles become rigid in application and
must be "applied as they are written." It would almost seem
as if ticket-scalpers were mentioned and safeguarded by express
provision of the Constitution of the United States. The theater
does not come within Lord Chief Justice Hale's definition, some
centuries ago, of a business "affected with a public interest," and
therefore ticket-scalping evils of today may not be controlled.
The court deciding this case was also different from that in
the Evclid case. The majority in the ticket-scalping case is
composed of the three dissenters in the zoning case, together
with Mr. Justice Sutherland and the Chief Justice.
The opinion of the court seems entirely forgetful that, with
the approval of the courts, large sums of money raised by public
taxation now go into devices for public recreation. See Booth
v. City of Minneapolis, 163 Minn. 223, 203 N. W. 62.5 (1925)
where public expenditure was for land to be used for a public
golf course. The purpose of such expenditure is not dissimilar
from that sought by zoning ordinances. And the result aimed
at is not dissimilar from that involved in the regulation of ticket-
scalping.
Municipal theaters are common in continental cities, and at
least one state court has assumed it to be proper for a city to
987
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subscribe to stock of a private theater company. First Munici-
pality v. Orleans Theater Co., 2 Rob. (La.) 209 (1842). In
principle it is difficult to distinguish between theaters and golf
courses or between theaters and municipal bands. Loan Asso-
ciation v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1875) held that a tax
levied for other than a public purpose is invalid. If scalping
of theater tickets cannot be regulated, how is it possible to jus-
tify the expenditure of public money for types of recreation
similar to the theater? When an evil cannot be controlled under
private management, is there a sufficient public interest to sup-
port the expenditure of public funds?
It is unfortunate that the attitude taken in this case will in-
vite more vigorous judicial contest of policies that properly fall
within the field of legislative determination. "Due process" as
applied by the courts is, of necessity, without definite standard,
and must be applied to the facts of specific cases. A refusal
to define a broad limitation of this character maintains a de-
sirable flexibility in our constitutional system. But this very
flexibility carries with it a constant danger that the court will
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature as to the
proper policy of legislation. This the court declined to do in the
Euclid case, but has done as to ticket-scalping in Tyson v.
Banton.
W. F. D.
ENFORCING PROHIBITION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULE ON
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
The rule in federal courts and some state courts rendering
inadmissible evidence obtained by an unreasonable search has
since 1920 been applied almost exclusively to cases of prohibition
violations. The attempt of judges to restate the rule in the
light of these new conditions has produced hundreds of printed
decisions.' But such decisions reflect merely a theoretical appli-
cation. The real test of the rule's utility must be sought in its
practical operation.2
'For a collection of recent decisions see (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
536; (1927) 27 CoL. L. Rnv. 300.
2 The writer is indebted to Professor John Barker Waite of the Universi-
ty of Michigan Law School for data in this comment concerning Michigan.
The remainder of the material is based upon personal investigation. Fed-
eral and state prosecuting attorneys, commissioners and prohibition agents
were interviewed in New York City, Boston, Providence, R. I.; New
Haven, Hartford and New London, Conn.; Newark and Trenton, N. J.; and
the District of Columbia. Information as also secured from the Depart-
ment of Justice and the Prohibition unit of the Treasury department in
Washington, D. C. In none of the offices visited were suitable statistical
records available. This phase of the situation is discussed more fully infra.
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This question has tvo aspects. It is important first to under-
stand the operation of the rule as a matter of procedure. Then
it is necessary to determine the extent to which the rule fulfills
its purpose as a safeguard of constitutional rights. Any justifi-
cation of the rule must include both considerations.
From a procedural point of view, the operation of the rule
is'to a large extent governed by more general policies of prohi-
bition enforcement. This is particularly true in the federal
courts of New York, New Jersey, Connecticut and Massachusetts.
In those districts the federal attorneys have for several years
sought to relieve congestion in the courts by prosecuting only
those prohibition cases in which convictions are certain. A
case founded upon a defective seizure will be immediately dis-
carded rather than held for trial under the risk of a suppression
of evidence.: As a result of this policy the number of motions
for the suppression of evidence because it was illegally obtained
has been materially reduced.
Other factors have also contributed to the decrease in the
number of motions to suppress evidence. Out of the mass of
printed precedent a new federal rule defined to meet the needs
of prohibition seems gradually to be crystallizing so that its
application to typical sets of facts may be predicted with in-
creasing accuracy. The old search warrants in use at the begin-
ning of the prohibition era have been superseded by new forms
technically less vulnerable. Also the government attorneys, be-
cause of the frequency with which the question has arisen, have
become more skilled in the law of searches and seizuresA
It is, however, impossible to ascertain more definitely the
3 In Connecticut, prohibition agents are instructed by the district attor-
ney to report no case based upon a defective search. In New Yorl, the
United States attorney handling cases at the commissioner's hearing ap-
parently may at his discretion dismiss any case where con.iction is doubt-
ful. The United States attorney in New Jersey rejects, because of faulty
foundations, eighty per cent of all cases reported by the Prohibition Unit.
As a result of this policy the number of disposals by pleas of guilty has
greatly increased. It is stated that ninety-five per cent of all liquor cases
in the federal courts of Massachusetts are ended on pleas of guilty without
trial.
4 The decrease in the number of motions to suppress evidence began in
the New York districts late in 1925. Up to that time the question had
been raised in practically every ease. Today it is seldom raised after the
commissioner's hearing, where it now arises in only one out of five cases.
The decrease began in New Jersey about the same time. It was hastened
by the abolition of the use of the search warrant in the typical raid. In
Connecticut, the decrease also followed closely upon that of New York,
while in Massachusetts and Rhode Island a change was noted a- early as
1923. The situation in the District of Columbia has been unique. There
prohibition caused little increase in the use of the motion because the
courts -were experienced in applying the federal rule to police cases.
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extent of this decrease in litigation on the admissibility of un-
reasonably seized evidence unless through a minute examination
of the dockets of each court. Nowhere has an attempt been
made to gather statistics either upon the number and disposi-
tion of motions to suppress or upon any other problem of
searches and seizures. Improvement in the operation of the
federal rule has been haphazard. The impressions of attorneys,
investigators or judges, who for years have been in daily touch
with the situation, are largely conjectural. This is but one more
instance of the deplorable dearth bf records in the field of crim-
inal law.
But the mere decrease in the use of the motion does not mean
that the federal rule has been completely adjusted to prolibition
enforcement. Its operation is simply shifted from the courtroom
to the field. Obstacles that before were met in trial, now arise
earlier, when cases are being constructed. The refusal of the
federal attorney to wrestle with the difficulties of unreasonably
seized evidence has forced the prohibition agent to assume the
burden. His ability to interpret the scope of the federal rule
when making his raids governs the degree of efficiency with
which prohibition is to be enforced.5
One of the chief difficulties presented by this situation in
which the searching agent and not the prosecuting attorney is
charged with interpreting the reasonableness of a seizure, is
the lack of co-ordination between the activities of the Prohibi-
tion Unit of the United States Treasury Department and those
of the Department of Justice. The administration of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act is in the hands of the Prohibition Unit.
Raids, seizures and arrests, as well as regulations, are made by
the officials of that unit without direct advice from the Depart-
ment of Justice. The latter department controls a given case
only after it has been reported for prosecution. From that point
onward, the matter is entirely in the hands of United States at-
torneys, but an effort is seldom made to co-operate with the
Prohibition Unit in the legal aspects of the case preliminary to
trial. This lack of co-operation is also felt when the Depart-
ment of Justice is working on appeals. Briefs are prepared and
decisions ultimately made without an adequate understanding
of the problems of administration on the part of either prosecut-
ing attorneys or judges.6
The recent decision of United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 Fed.
5 The inefficiency of agents in this respect is felt particularly in New
York and Rhode Island. It is said largely to result from frequent changes
in the personnel of prohibition squads. The employment of trained at-
torneys has in many places improved the work of prohibition units.
6 Lack of co-ordination also exists in the internal organization of the
Department of Justice. For instance, apparently no attempt has been
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(2d) 202 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) illustrates the necessity for co-or-
dination between the enforcement officers and the judiciary. The
court in that case declared unreasonable a seizure of papers of
great evidentiary value although made in the course of a lawful
arrest. The decision is based purely upon a construction of prece-
dent. No notice was apparently taken of the fact that the
papers and records of those engaged in large conspiracies to
violate the Prohibition Act are practically indispensable in trac-
ing the illicit enterprises to their sources. Prohibition agents
and attorneys in close touch with the task of running down
these conspiracies view the Kirscekeiblatt decision with disap-
pointnent, for, they declare, it has closed the most effective
avenue of attack upon huge, elusive combinations now operating
in the heart of New York City.
An understanding of the practical problems met in the ad-
ministration of the law would also be valuable in interpreting
the relation of the federal rule to several sections of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act. Section 25 of the Act states that no
search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occu-
pied as such unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of in-
toxicating liquor. 7 Evidence secured in violation of that section
has recently been declared inadmissible on the ground that the
federal rule excludes evidence illegally obtained.8  But that rule
is based upon the provisions of the Fourth Amendment which
concern an unreasoable seizure, and illegality and unreason-
ableness are not necessarily synonymous. Certainly the mere
violation of any existing regulation ought not in every case to
render the search unreasonableY This distinction becomes im-
made at the central offices in Washington to investigate problems on
searches and seizures confronting the individual district attorneys through-
out the country. Such problems are deemed ones of administration to be
left entirely in the hands of the attorneys in each district. Only through
the occasional personal experiences of some of the attorneys taken from the
field to the central offices, does the Attorney General's staff in Washington
have any direct contact with the practical difficulties. It is true that echoes
of these difficulties are heard in Washington through communications from
district attorneys seeking authority to appeal from rulings on motions to
suppress. But the policy of the central offices is to withhold such authori-
zation without further investigation of the problems involved.
741 Stat. 315 (1919), U. S. Comp. Stat. (Supp. 1923) § 1013Sk,,m.
8 Schroeder v. United States, 14 Fed. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926).
9 See the dissenting opinion of Anderson, J., in Lee v. United States, 14
Fed. (2d) 400 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926). Certiorari for the Lee case has been
granted by the Supreme Court. The basis of the government's appeal will
be, inter alia, this distinction b'etween an illegal and an unreasonable search.
A decision by the Supreme Court establishing that distinction would be a
clarifying re-definition of the federal rule. In this connection cf. Mr. Jus-
tice Stone's opinion in the recent decision of McGuire v. United States, 47
Sup. Ct. 259, 260 (U. S. 1927): "A criminal prosecution is more than a
game in which the government may be checkmated and the game lost mere-
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portant when, as is often the case, the present application of
the federal rule to section 25 of the Act permits the maintenance
of laxge distilleries under the guise of private dwellings. This
interpretation of section 25 is declared by officials of the Prohi-
bition unit in Washington to prevent any effective enforcement
of the prohibition laws.
But, while the application of the federal rule to prohibition
cases has become largely a function of the searching agent, the
question is still frequently raised after prosecution has begun.
The attack on the seizure is usually first made at the hearing
before a United States Commissioner, who now has acquired
many of the duties of a judge in the first instance. In New
York, for example, the commissioner will listen to testimony
concerning the seizure and often dismiss the case outright. The
commissioner's findings of facts constituting probable cause are
conclusive. 10 But frequent appeals are taken from his findings
of law.1
Conflict exists, however, on the privilege of a defendant when
arraigned before a commissioner to controvert the affidavit and
testimony taken for the issuance of the search warrant. The
question is one of interpreting the extent to which the practice
under the Espionage Act has been incorporated into the National
Prohibition Act. 2  In Rhode Island, one commissioner refuses
to permit the warrant to be controverted. But the Massachu-
setts Commissioners are in accord with those of the New York
districts in recognizing the privilege.
13
ly because its officers have not played according to the rule. The use by
prosecuting ofcers of evidence illegally acquired by others does not neces-
sarily violate the Constitution, nor effect its admissibility." [Italics ours].
It was held in the McGuire case that the fact that an officer had illegally
destroyed the liquor did not render his testimony concerning it inadmissible
at trial.
10 Gracie v. United States, 15 Fed. (2d) 644 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
13 United States v. Ephraim, 8 Fed. (2d) 512 (D. C. R. I. 1925).
12 See CORNELiuS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURSS (1926) §§ 89, 256. In United
States v. Ephraim, supra note 11, it was held that section 15 of the Espion-
age Act authorizing the commissioner to permit the warrant to be contro-
verted was by reference incorporated into the National Prohibition Act,
supra note 7. A district court is without power to review the action of a
commissioner refusing to quash a search warrant issued by him. The com-
missioner's action is reviewable only upon writ of error by the Circuit
Court of Appeals. United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. '713 (S. D. N.
Y. 1920); In Re 1169 Myrtle Avenue, 288 Fed. 384 (E. D. N. Y. 1923).
The much debated question, whether an ordinary prohibition agent is a
proper "civil" officer to whom a search warrant may be issued under the
National Prohibition Act has evidently been settled in the affirmative.
Steele v. United States, No. 2, 267 U. S. 505, 45 Sup. Ct. 417 (1925).
"3 In Massachusetts every search warrant issued by a commissioner is
first approved by a United States attorney. This policy reduces the possi-
bility of attack on the warrant.
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The part played by the United States Commissioner in issuing
search warrants varies according to the searching methods in
each district. In Connecticut, where the state courts prosecute
most of the prohibition cases, the commissioner issues relatively
few warrants. 4  In New Jersey, the use of the search warrant
by federal agents has been discarded, except for the raiding of
places to which the officers have no open access, on the ground
that it is not adapted to the typical prohibition raid. Searches
without warrants, of course, must still be reasonable under
penalty of rejection by the court, but suppression of evidence
because of technical defects in the construction of the warrant
is in New Jersey avoided. The marked decrease in the num-
ber of successful motions in New Jersey since the adoption of
this practice is an indication of the extent to which the opera-
tion of the federal rule may be limited without substantial viola-
tion of rights.
The practice in New York with respect to search warrants is
exactly opposite to that in New Jersey. The warrant is used in
almost every search. The reason is a practical one. For while
in most cases the preliminary facts upon which a search warrant
must be based in themselves constitute probable cause for an
immediate search without a warrant, officers often find it con-
venient to delay raids lest their presence in a particular locality
be disclosed too soon. The practice, therefore, is to spend sev-
eral days collecting facts against a number of places in the same
neighborhood, and then to use those facts to secure warrants
for simultaneous raids at a later date. This use of the search
warrant, which permits raiders to follow in the tracks of "under
cover men," is in strict conformity with the requirements of the
federal rule, and hence, according to the formula, safeguards the
defendant's constitutional rights. Yet, to the man on the street,
it constitutes a much greater violation than a search declared
unreasonable according to some technical view of probable cause.
According to the decision of United States v. Weeks,'1 the
validity of the search must be questioned in the normal case by
motion before trial. But in New York the practice of raising
the question at any time during trial has developed.'0 The ques-
14 The United States Commissioner at Hartford has issued no more than
twelve search warrants in three years. In New Haven, the conuniszioner
issues an average of four a month. The variation reflects the relative ac-
tivities of the state officials in the two counties. Agents returned half the
warrants issued by the New Haven commissioner during the last seven
months of 1926 without having found the articles sought. The explanation
given for the failures is that the agents' preliminary steps forewarn the
suspected persons.
15 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
16 Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 2G1 (1921) and
Amos v. United States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 200 (1921) are the au-
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tion *is considered in the New Jersey district to be governed by
the trial court's discretion, and as a result motions made at
trial are generally heard. But in Massachusetts, Connecticut
and Rhode Island, the procedure is still in conformity with the
rule in the Weeks case. When the point does arise in a trial
in the New York districts it is rapidly settled. No separate
hearing is conducted. Facts are established by affidavits and
arguments are as far as possible cut short. Often the court,
having already gathered the gist of the case, will peremptorily
grant or deny the motion as soon as it is made. In other dis-
tricts, however, such as Connecticut and Massachcusetts, the
hearings on the motions to suppress evidence are trials in
themselves.
Observations on the operation of the federal rule thus far
made have assumed a straightforward effort on the part of offi-
cials to comply with the rule. Obviously, however, the strict
requirements of the rule would make the prosecution of some law
breakers exceedingly difficult if not impossible. When the gov-
ernment officials are confronted with that situation it is neces-
sary in one way or another to circumvent the rule. This is most
easily accomplished by using state or municipal officers to make
the search.
It is impossible to discover exactly the extent to which state
officers are used in federal cases. In New York most of the
small cases in the federal courts are reported by municipal police.
They, of course, may testify and introduce evidence in a federal
court, irrespective of the reasonableness of their searches. In
Massachusetts and Rhode Island a large number of federal in-
dictments for the illegal transportation of liquor are based on
seizures made by state officers. On the other hand, in New Jer-
sey and Connecticut, state officers seldom figure in federal courts.
In a recent decision, Byars v. United States, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (U.
S. 1927), the Supreme Court declared that the mere participation
of a federal agent under color of his office in a raid otherwise
conducted by state police was sufficient to render the search sub-
ject to the federal rule. This holding is a distinct rebuke to a
large number of lower court judges who in the past have accepted
the testimony* of state officers under almost any circumstances
short of actual collusion with federal agents.17 It is doubtful,
thority cited for this practice. The Gouled case permitted the question
to be raised at trial where it appeared that the defendant did not know
the articles had been seized until they were offered against him. In the
Amos case a petition for the return of evidence was made after the jury
had been sworn, but before evidence had been offered. This was held
sufficiently timely, the court basing its decision on the Gouled case. But
neither case is on its facts precedent for the prevailing practice in the
federal courts of New York and New Jersey.
17 See (1927) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 536, 539.
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however, whether the Bya's case will prevent the practice. The
federal officials will simply resort to greater secrecy than now is
exercised. a
Other methods of avoiding the operation of the federal rule
are widely used. Thus, in a recent case, United States v,. Man-
del, 17 Fed. (2d) 270 (D. C. Mlass. 1927) it was held that em-
ployees of the lessee of raided premises who were in possession
of the premises at the time of the search, were not in a position
to question the reasonableness of the seizure. Upon the authority
of this case, the United States attorneys in Massachusetts have
instructed raiding agents to secure a denial of ownership from
those in possession when the search is made. In Connecticut,
federal attorneys, citing Rozida v. United States, 10 Fed. (2d)
916 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926), have instructed the prohibition squad
that when agents get into a suspected place without a warrant,
one agent may be left on guard, while the others return to the
commissioner for a warrant which will validate the seizure.2
The conclusion to be drawn from a survey of the procedural
operation of the rule is not entirely satisfactory. It is true that
the number of motions to suppress evidence has decreased, but
on the other hand, the rule still troubles the searching agents.
The lack of co-ordination between governmental departments
prevents a more practical adjustment of the rule to prohibition
enforcement, and government officials still find ways to circum-
vent the rule whenever that is necessary.
But it still remains to consider the extent to which the rule
fulfills its purpose as a safeguard of constitutional rights. It has
frequently been suggested that the proper way to discourage an
unreasonable search is not to suppress the evidence, but to prose-
cute the officer.' 9 Unquestionably, an officer who makes an un-
reasonable search commits a trespass; and under an act of
Congress a prohibition agent who searches a private dwelling
without a warrant is guilty of a misdemeanor. :" But civil suits
against trespassing officers rarely occur,2 and it is doubtful that
28 If the attorneys in Connecticut are correct in their interpretation of
the Rouda case, the federal rule is practically nullified. It is to be noted,
however, that the original entry in the Rouda case was held to be lawful.
The discussion of the effect of a subsequently issued warrant on a prior
unlawful entry is dicta. See 10 Fed. (2d) at 918.
19 4 WIGMoRE, EWDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2184, at 639.
2042 Stat. 223 (1921).
21 Four cases have been found in the reports since 1918. In Hart v.
Evans, 10 Fed. (2) 892 (D. C. App. 1926) judgment for a defendant pro-
hibition agent was affirmed on the ground that the warrant was legal on
its fade and the plaintiff had consented to the search. Nothing was found
during the search. Banfill v. Byrd, 122 Aliss. 283, 84 So. 227 (1920) was
a suit against officers for the unlawful search of a hotel. The case was re-
versed in favor of the plaintiff. In Smith v. Tate, 143 Tenn. 268, 227 S.
W. 1026 (1921) the officers were sued for searching a house where a sus-
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even one case of a prosecution under the Act of 1921 can be found
in the federal reporters.22  Certainly, motions to suppress evi-
dence occur much more frequently than either civil or criminal
actions against officers. Several factors contribute to this varia-
tion between punitive and non-punitive methods of giving effect
to the Fourth Amendment. The average citizen is reluctant to
proceed in court against a public officer; and federal attorneys,
in whose hands criminal prosecutions rest, frankly admit an un-
willingness to incur the antagonism of prohibition squads, upon
whom they must depend for successful administration of their
offices. To this extent it is probably true that the threat of di-
rect suits against the searching officer is not alone an adequate
protection against unwarranted searches.
But it does not necessarily follow that the federal rule is a
satisfactory substitute. The procedure to suppress evidence has
developed many technicalities. A motion is often successfully
made even where there has been no real invasion of the defen-
dant's rights. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that
the federal rule in New York does not prevent practices which to
the layman at least, represent the grossest kind of intrusion.
Furthermore, the effect of the federal rule upon unreasonable
searches is not the same in all jurisdictions. In Connecticut,
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, for example, the rule is not
observed in the state courts where prohibition violations are
usually prosecuted. While in New York, New Jersey and the
District of Columbia, prohibition is enforced entirely in federal
courts, and in states like Michigan it is enforced through local
courts that have adopted the federal rule.
23
pected criminal was thought to be hiding. Judgment for the defendants
was affirmed. Weaver v. Ficke, 174 Ky. 432, 192 S. W. 515 (1918) was a
suit for malicious trespass by individuals armed with a defective warrant
in search of half the carcass of a hog. Judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed.
22 The act is mentioned in this respect by way of dictum in Ex Parto
Houston, 282 Fed. 723, 725 (S. D. Fla. 1922). But the outcome of section
6 seems to have been simply to establish one more test for the theoretical
definition of a reasonable search. Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280 (1924); Lindsly v. United States, 12 Fed. (2d) 771
(C. C. A. 5th, 1926). Cf,, also, United States v. Costanzo, 13 Fed. (2d)
259 (W. D. N. Y. 1926).
23 Federal courts are not deemed suitable for the intensive police work
required in the enforcement of prohibition. For that reason the machinery
of state courts is utilized wherever possible. The federal officials desire
to prosecute only large cases involving conspiracies, or cases not covered
by the state law. For example, the state laws in Massachusetts and
Rhode Island do not stipulate the forfeiture of vehicles engaged in the il-
legal transportation of liquor. Hence it is necessary to try such cases in
the federal courts. But cases of the small offenders are taken to the federal
courts only where the local tribunals have been unreasonably lax. In
New York, however, a repeal of the state enforcement act has shifted the
COMMENTS
If the federal rule is an indispensable adjunct of the Fourth
Amendment, or kindred provisions in state constitutions, it would
seem that the citizens in non-federal rule jurisdictions are being
subjected to many more outrages against liberty than those who
come under the protection of the rule. This, however, is not the
case. Aside from the fact that a federal warrant issues less
easily than a state warrant, the character of federal raids in
New York, for example, does not seem substantially to differ
from the practices of state officers in Connecticut. As a general
rule, both endeavor to conform to the requirements of reason-
ableness. "4 Indeed, state prosecutors in Connecticut insist upon
reasonable conduct, if only because it has been found that the
jury will be sympathetic toward the victim of an unreasonable
search.
The federal rule may in some instances forestall a substantial
violation of the individual's rights. But its effect in that re-
spect is much less frequent than are the opportunities which it
provides for the protection of guilty defendants on purely tech-
nical grounds. To maintain that the federal rule is necessary
is to assert that the citizens in the majority of the United States
never have been constitutionally secure.
MINORITY INTERESTS IN REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS
In the recent case of Allan v. Moline Plow Co., 14 Fed. (2d)
912 (C. C. A. 8th, 1926) an Illinois corporation, pursuant to a
reorganization plan, sold out to a Virginia corporation of the
same name. The plaintiff was a bondholder of the Illinois cor-
poration to whose bond was attached an agreement to bring no
action on the bond unless twenty-five per cent of the bondholders
joined. Over ninety-five per cent of both secured and unsecured
creditors assented to the reorganization plan. In a suit against
the Virginia corporation to set aside the conveyance as fraudu-
lent, and for an order that the assets of the Illinois corporation
so received be held for the benefit of the creditors of said cor-
poration judgment was rendered for the defendant. It is well
settled that such collateral agreements will be construed with a
note and mortgage so as to control the latter., But, for reasons
which will appear later in this comment, it is submitted that the
same result should be reached even in the absence of such a col-
lateral agreement.
entire burden to federal courts, and in New Jersey, where the state courts
are unv.illing to undertake a systematic enforcement of the state law, al-
most all cases are tried as violations of the National Act For a discussion
of jurisdictional problems in the enforcement of the lSth Amendment in
the absence of state legislation see (1926) 36 YALE LW JoURtNAL, 260.
24 In Michigan, where officers are unable to make a valid search they
often resort to a number of illegal raids merely to harass the suspected
violator and thus force him out of business.
I McClure v. Township of Oxford, 94 U. S. 429, 433 (1876).
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The estimate that about fifty per cent of American corpora-
tions and railroads owning one-half of the mileage in the United
States'have been reorganized within a period of twenty years 2
gives some idea of the importance of reorganization. The pro-
cedure of reorganization is becoming recognized as "the machin-
ery by which arrangements between the creditors and other
parties in interest are carried into effect . . ." 3 It has been
described as the "rearrangement of the financial structure of
an incorporated enterprise, rendered necessary by insolvency
or by the inability of the corporation to secure the necessary
funds for its operations because of obstacles resulting from its
financial structure." 4 Almost invariably it is "based upon the
foreclosure of mortgages or the enforcement of the rights of
creditors in some form." r It is essentially a redrawing of the
financial plan with a view to contraction, although corporations
sometimes emerge from the process with an increased capitali-
zation. 7  This latter effect has at times been produced by the
rather lavish distributions of common shares during reorgani-
zations of railroads in order to placate disgruntled shareholders
and creditors of the corporation.8 Industrial reorganizations
often result in an increased capitalization of the corporation but
for different reasons. The financial difficulty of an industrial
is more likely to be due to the oppression of a large floating debt
(though problems of marketability, fluctuation in public demand,
and adverse competition should not be overlooked). Relief is
found in funding the debt, although the result is to increase the
capitalization and also the fixed charges.0
The problem of reorganization is one of social expedience and
economic policy as much as a purely legal matter.10 The im,
mediate problems are to attract new money into the enterprise
and to take care of the dissenters.1 Since the corporation is
2 See chapter by CRAVATH on "Reorganization of Corporations" Soiu
PHASES OF CORPORATE FINANCING (1917) 154.
3 Canada Southern Ry. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 539, 3 Sup. Ct. 363,
371 (1883).
4 CRAVATH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 154.
5 Ibid. 155. (
6 5 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1921) 3.
7 The term "capitalization" is herein used to indicate the aggregate face
value, so far as this is possible, of the outstanding bonds and shares of a
corporation.
8 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 160.
9 DEWING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 167.
10 "Lawyers are apt to exaggerate their own importance and the signifi-
cance of their legal machinery in determining the form and details of re-
organization procedure, forgetful that a reorganization is primarily an ad-
justment of human motives and economic conditions, circumscribed, rather
than determined by the law." DEWING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 31.
11 Rosenberg, Reorganization-The Next Step (1922) 22 COL. L. Rav. 14.
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in financial difficulties, new money can be attracted only by offer-
ing a return which is high enough to compensate for the unusual
risk (which is obviously impractical) or by affording such new
money a lien prior to the old secured indebtedness. Among the
dissenters are to be found honest men with bona fide claims as
well as those "guerillas who hang about the outskirts of re-
organizations and endeavor to levy tribute as a condition of
abating the nuisance of their presence." 2 Among industrials,
there are often the additional problems of getting relief from
the burden of unpaid dividends on cumulative preferred shares
or the burden of a floating debt. The former is solved by a
mere capital adjustment, relatively easy in the case of a healthy
corporation. The latter may be funded.13
The defects in the present practice are the lack of control
by the courts, the danger of tyranny by the majority, and the
bogey of obstructive tactics by the minority. The problem is
really one of extinguishing claims of dissenting creditors against
the property of the insolvent with something other than cash.
What is needed is an arrangement that will bring all parties in
interest together, an opportunity for grievances to be aired,
claims to be adjudicated, and, finally, a plan which shall bind
all. Such an arrangement would save time and expense and
relieve from those additional burdens which now often fall upon
the reorganized property as a result of protracted legal pro-
ceedings.
There has been a gradual increase in the use of judicial coer-
cion in reaching such settlements but this has been more marked
in the case of railroads and public utilities than among indus-
trials. This is partly explained by the public interest in the
continuation of the utility 14 with reference to which the bond-
2 A. H. Joline, quoted in CRAVATH, op cit. supra note 2, at 197.
'3 The capital adjustment, which is more of a bookkeeping change than
a vital alteration of the financial structure of the company, "may take the
form of: (1) the issue of a new higher dividend-paying preferred stock in
exchange for the old cumulative preferred stock with its arrears of unpaid
dividends; (2) a funding of the preferred stock dividend accumulations into
new securities; (3) the funding of the old contingent charge preferred
stock, with its accumulated dividends, into new bonds bearing interest
charges lower than the dividend rate on the old preferred stock." Dnv;-
ING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 176.
The floating debt is the unsecured outstanding obligations of the company
arising out of the ordinary course of business. It may be funded by a bond
issue. Ibid. 174.
14 "The necessary conclusion is that the state has a right to enforce the
continuous exercise of the corporate powers and franchises for public use,
to the exhaustion of the value of such property and franchises; and this
is true, no matter what private right may embrace the title of the property."
Gates v. Boston & New York Air Line R. R., 53 Conn. 333, 344, 5 AtI. 695,
700 (1885) ; writ of error dismissed 122 U. S. 646 (1887).
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holders are regarded as having contracted. 15 Another reason is
the difference in the respective forms of capitalization of public
utilities and industrials. The amount of bonds is relatively small
among industrials, 1r whereas among public utilities generally the
proportion of bonds is estimated at sixty per cent.1 7  When
losses occur, the railroad bondholder is more likely to discover
that the property securing his bond has depreciated, and so,
finding his position as a bondholder is not as impregnable as
the strong legal verbiage upon his bond would seem to indicate,
he is less likely to resist coercion than is the industrial bond-
holder who still has, as a buffer between himself and personal
loss, the greater equity remaining to the shareholders. The
problem of coercing secured creditors does not arise where there
are tangible assets sufficient to liquidate such claims. But there
may be so great a difference between the value of the assets of
the company as such and the value of the going concern as to
warrant the belief that there will be enough assets to pay secured
creditors and still leave an equity remaining in the shareholders.
Granting a respite to the company under these circumstances
will not only profit the secured creditors but encourage the share-
holders to advance new money. Courts, consequently, are more
reluctant to coerce the minority in the case of industrials and
apply with less liberality the rule of Fosdick v. Schall. Is Until
recently, the courts felt that they had little authority to act in
reorganizati6n proceedings. In Merchants' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Chicago Rys.,19 the court refused to authorize a reorganized
company to issue bonds and make them a first lien over the objec-
tion of prior mortgagees whose liens would thereby be displaced.
The machinery provided by the Bankruptcy Act would appear
to be of no substantial value in dealing with these problems of
reorganization. 2
0
In general, even now, the majority of the bondholders can
not compel the minority to accept payment of their claims in
new securities rather than in money. In Canada So. Ry. v.
15 (1924) 28 A. L. R. 1196.
16 DEVING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 163.
'17 RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1927) 310.
is 99 U. S. 235 (1878) permitting a court to insist that a receiver shall
meet "current expenses" incurred during and immediately before the re-
ceivership before meeting fixed charges on capital. The justification for this
rule is said to be "the imperative public necessity of operation, a necessity
which the public character of the railroad business places ahead of the
merely private property rights of stockholders and bondholders." Diivm,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 100. For a discussion of the cases interpreting this
rule, see ibid. 101-2 and notes.
19 158 Fed. 923 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907).
-20 ROSENBERG, op. cit. supra note 11, at 14.
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Geblard,21 the Supreme Court said: "in the absence of statutory
authority or some provision in the instrument which establishes
the trust, nothing can be done by a majority, however large,
which will bind a minority without their consent." Nor does
it matter what the motive of the minority may be.2 The power
to foreclose and sell 23 is so inherently imbedded in our concept
of a mortgage that the possibility of plucking this "rooted sor-
row" seems remote.
The tendency away from this view is most noticeable, as stated
before, in the field of railroad reorganization. "Railroad mort-
gages are not sacred because of the strong legal terms in vhich
they are drawn, but are dependant on success in the business of
transportation." 2 4  The gradual transition toward a stronger
judicial policy is marked by several leading cases, each a further
development away from the mortgage taboo. Caizada So. Ry.
v. Gebiwrd 25 held legislation valid whereby minority interests
are obliged to accept securities in a reorganized corporation
when the plan of reorganization is approved by the court. The
case is only a recognition of a Canadian reconstruction statute
(involving coercion of minorities) as binding upon the holders
of securities of a railroad company chartered in Canada, even
though such holders were citizens of the United States. -r0 The
case suggests, however, that confirmation of a reorganization
scheme is similar to a composition in bankruptcy which is bind-
ing on a non-assenting minority.2 T There is no more deprivation
of property without due process here than in the case of an
ordinary bankruptcy statute. Though the statute involved here
was Canadian, this case tends at least to uphold the constitu-
tionality of legislation to this effect.
It is the opinion of one well known writer that the federal
courts of equity have power without the aid of legislation to
compel all creditors to accept something other than cash in
satisfaction of their claims.23  This is based upon the language
used by the court in Northern Pacific R. R. v. Boyd.29 In that
21 Supra note 3, at 535, 3 Sup. Ct. 363 at 368. See also Walker, Rcor-
ganization By Decree (1921) 6 CORN. L. Q. 154.
22 See Hallister v. Stewart, 111 N. Y. 644, 660, 19 N. E. 782, 789 (18S9).
23 Walker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 165.
-1 Green, Te Connmercial Basis for Railway Recivcrship (1894) 33 a.
L. REG. 417, quoted in DEWING, op. cit. supra note 6, at 31, n. 3. "The let-
ter of the railroad mortgage bond has come to be nothing more than mere
legal verbiage. . . ." Ibid. 87.
25 Supra note 3.
26 Walker, op. cit. supra note 21, at 157.
2
7 Svpra note 3, at 536, 3 Sup. Ct. at 369; Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note
11, at 18.
23 Ibid. 20.
29 228 U. S. 482, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 (1912).
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case, Boyd was a judgment creditor of the Northern Pacific
Railroad. The property of the railroad was solo to a newly
created railway company in pursuance of a reorganization plan.
Boyd, not having been a party to the foreclosure, claimed that
the property of the old company in the hands of the new com-
pany was subject to the payment of his debt. The claim, brought
fifteen years after the reorganization, was sustained. The actual
holding is that "a plan of reorganization which admits stock-
holders of the debtor company to an interest in the reorganized
company, even upon the payment of cash, is constructively
fraudulent as against creditors if it does not make to them a
fair offer of an interest in the reorganized company, and that
in such case creditors may follow the property of their debtor
into the hands of the reorganized company. The actual deci-
sion was purely negative, that this reorganization was inequi-
table and would be disregarded as against the plaintiff." 31 The
result is that general creditors are not barred by such a re-
organization but may still attack its terms. This case was at
first regarded as a nightmare because it subjected a reorganiza-
tion sale "to serious danger of subsequent destructive attack." 1
However, one of the authorities who was alarmed at first has
since changed his mind.32 A dictum in the case 33 suggests that
it is not necessary to pay unsecured creditors in cash, that if
they decline a fair offer they are in the same position as any
other judgment creditors and, upon their refusal to agree to A
fair plan, they may no longer come into equity to attack its
terms. If the dictum means more than merely loosely spoken
words (which one authority asserts is the limit of their signi-
ficance) ' 4 it necessarily follows that unsecured creditors have the
option of accepting either payment in such securities as are
allotted to them under the reorganization plan or "the empty
relief of a worthless judgment against the old company." a
In the Boyd case, only unsecured creditors were b6fore the
3o Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step: A Reply to Mr. James N.
Rosenberg (1922) 22 COL. L. REV. 121, 122.
3'Rosenberg, A New Scheme of Reorganization (1917) 17 COL. L. Rsv.
523, 526. "The result of this decision has been to introduce the greatest
uncertainty and confusion in the reorganizations which have since been
attempted and those which are now pending. It has materially reduced
the opportunities for stockholders to participate in reorganizations con-
trolled by mortgage bondholders, for, manifestly, the simplest way for a
committee of mortgage bondholders to avoid the embarrassments of the
Boyd case is completely to exclude the stockholders and thereby, gain free-
dom to exclude the unsecured debt." See also CRAVATH, op. cit. supra note
2, at 195.
32 Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 11, at 14.
3 Supra note 29, at 508, 33 Sup. Ct. 554 at 561.
34 Swaine, op. cit. supra note 30, at 122.
85 Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 11, at 17.
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court, not mortgage holders. Yet it has been suggested -' that
had the interest of secured creditors been involved, if notice
were given, and the assent of the majority 37 of such creditors
obtained, new money could be given a lien prior to or on a
parity with the bondholders despite the objection of the dissent-
ing minority. The same author 3s suggests that an extension of
this treatment of minorities to industrials is likely to occur if
some large industrial affected with an undoubted public interest
goes into a receivership. No case has as yet gone so far as to
uphold such treatment of secured creditors of public utilities.
The same may be said of both the secured and unsecured credi-
tors of industrials.
The dictum in the Boyd case would seem to have been followed
in the Rock Island 39 case. Here the court actually assumed the
power and, in effect, accomplished a reorganization by decree
without the burden or expense of a foreclosure sale. With re-
spect to outstanding claims, it fixed their value in new shares
which general creditors were required to accept because no other
provision was made for them. Here, however, no secured debt
was involved and the authority of the case is somewhat question-
able, it never having been appealed.
In Phipps v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.,40 the court compelled all
creditors, including the minority, to take shares for their claims,
denied them the right of suing the defendant new company and
even did away with the form of a sale to this company. Phipps,
a judgment creditor, was actually enjoined from bringing suit.
So far as unsecured creditors are concerned, the dictum in the
Boyd case seems to be more than merely loosely spoken words.
In Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetnay Explosives Co.,' a corpo-
ration in the hands of receivers prospered through the business
acumen of its receivers and the profits derived from war con-
tracts. The preferred shareholders, who had nine votes each
while their dividend payments were in default, arranged a meet-
ing at which they planned to approve a reorganization favorable
'r- Ibid.
37This suggests a further problem. There may be senior and junior lien
bondi. Among railroads, there may be, in addition, general underlying
bonds. What, among these, will constitute a majority is quite problema-
tical. A graduation of voting power may be worked out according to the
seniority of the Hen.
3s Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 11, at 25.
39 American Steel Foundries v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. (1917), not re-
ported. Discussed in Walker, op. cit. sztpra note 21, at 162.
40 284 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). Phipps, a judgment creditor of the
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. challenged a decree of the district court
preventing him from recovering on his judgment in any other way than
than that provided by a reorganization plan approved by the court.
41252 Fed. 456 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918).
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to themselves. The common shareholders sought an injunction
to prevent the holding of the meeting. The district judge exam-
ined in detail the reorganization plan, concluded it was unfair
to the common shareholders, and granted the injunction. His
decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. This
has been hailed as "a notable milestone in the jurisprudence of
reorganization." 42
The cases, then, show a tendency of the courts to solve the
problems of reorganization through judicial coercion. In Eng-
land, a statute 43 provides thiat where a compromise is proposed
between a company and its creditors or between the company
and its members, it may, if sanctioned by the court, become bind-
ing upon all of them including secured as well as unsecured
creditors. Such a statute would be as valid in this country as
the Bankruptcy Act. It has been contended 44 that such a stat-
ute would have the advantage of permitting business men to
make their own contracts instead of having them imposed by
governmental agencies and "paternalistic" judges.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that the federal
courts of equity are better fitted for this.45 A set of prece-
dents has gradually grown up 40 which are more elastic than
the strict statutory requirements of bankruptcy proceedings.
The court can adapt its modes to changing economic problems
which seems preferable to the "straight-jacket" 41 nature of an
act of Congress. The real problems in a reorganization are
worked out by bankers, engineers and various kinds of technical
experts. The ultimate question is: is it fair? It is therefore
believed that statutory regulation might prove undesirable and
that federal judges are in a better position to solve these prob-
lems than a commission composed of political appointees whose
42Rosenberg, THE AETNA EXPLOSIVEs CAS E (1920) 20 COL. L. REV. 733,
at 740.
43 JOINT STOCK COiMPANIES ARRANGEMENT ACT, (1870) 33 & 34 Vict. c
104.
44 Swaine, op. cit. supra note 30, at 132.
45 "This is a question of equities; a question as to whether senior and
majority interests have been fair or oppressive to minorities and to tho
investors in junior securities. Have the mortgage bondholders exacted too
hard a bargain? Have the trade creditors been fairly dealt with? Have
the rights of the stockholders been protected? When plans finally come
before the court there is either agreement on these points, or a residuum
of difference on what generally reduces itself to the single question of fair-
ness, of justice. Are we to leave that question tb Federal Commissions,
whose membership is apt to be composed of political appointees holding
positions of short tenure? Is there any body of men to whom we can
more safely turn than to Federal judges who through life appointment are
detached from the personal equation?" ROSENBERG, CORPORATE REORGANI-
ZATION AND THE FEDERAL COURT (1924)p. x (preface).
46 CRAVATH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 159.
47 ROSENBERG, op. cit. supra note 45.
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term of office is limited. Under such an arrangement, the in-
terests of the bondholders would be safeguarded. They are
usually well represented at reorganization meetings. The head
of the bondholders' committee is usually a man who owns a
large number of the bonds himself. It is not like a sharehold-
ers meeting where large number of proxies may have been
scooped up by a zealous clique. It may be that the result of
such a policy will tend to drive investors from bonds into shares.
If so, the advantage will be on the investor's side. The man in-
vesting his savings seeks two tlngs, viz., security of his prin-
cipal, and a return on his investment. There is a popular im-
pression that the greater safety of bonds over shares is an ade-
quate recompense for the lower returns they offer. But this
popular fallacy has recently been challenged by careful studies
over long periods of time. 8 These studies show that an average
investor would be better off financially by buying common shares
than by buying bonds no matter during what phase of the finan-
cial cycle the purchases take place 0
In the last analysis, the current interest of both bondholder
and shareholder is in the going concern. If most of them want
to continue, how many shall be necessmy? There is an identity
of interest of all the security holders in the principal thing -
the going concern. If the judgment of a substantial number,
fairly exercised, is that the company continue, why should not
their combined judgment override the technical paper rights
of the minority?
PAYEES AS HOLDERS IN DUE COURSE
Recent decisions in England and in this country to the effect
that a payee may not be a holder in due course make it increas-
ingly apparent that uniformity of judicial opinion may not be
expected.: This will no doubt give further impetus to the vari-
48 VAN STRUI, INVESTING IN PURCHASING POWER (1925).
49 Ibid. 222-234.
1 Jones, Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd. [1926] A. C. 670. In this case B,
indebted to the defendants in the sum of £5000, and having no means of
paving, fraudulently persuaded the plaintiff corporation to sign an agre.-
ment making it agent for the sale of motor cars and requiring a £5000
deposit. On objection by the plaintiff to paying this sum to B, the latter
told the plaintiff that the defendants were his principals and suggested
that the money be paid to the defendants. Checks for £2000 and £3000
were drawn by plaintiff, delivered to B, who in turn delivered to the de-
fendants in payment of his debt. Subsequently the plaintiff gave a check
for £5000 directly to the defendants in exchange for the others. The de-
fendants, without notice of the fraud, cashed the check, and returned to B
goods which they held as security. On discovery of the fraud the plaintiff
sued to recover the £5000. A judgment for the plaintiff in the King's
Bench Division was reversed by the Court of Appeal. On appeal by the
plaintiff to the House of Lords, held, all the Law Lords concurring on this
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ous suggestions which have been made for the amendment of
the Negotiable Instruments Law relative to this point.2  In at
least one country, by express legislation, it is recognized that
the payee may be a holder in due course.3
The question is carefully analyzed in a recent article in which
a review of the English and American decisions, both before
and after the statutes, is made.4 From his analysis of the prob-
lem the writer concludes that in the light of the historical back-
ground it may well be held without amendment that a payee
who takes as "purchaser" may be a holder in due course, but
one who takes as a "promisee" may notA The outstanding illus-
point, that as defendants were payees they could not be holders in due
course. For note on this case see (1927) 40 HARv. L. REV. 494.
A similar problem was presented in Foster v. Security Bank & Trust Co.,
288 S. W. 438 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926), reversing a judgment for the de-
fendant rendered by the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in 249 S. W. 227
(1923). This was an action brought by the co-makers of a promissory
note against the payee, for the cancellation of the same. The payee had
received the note from the principal maker for value and without notice
of fraud or of the agreement between the co-makers that before delivery
additions would be made to their signatures so as to make the note the
obligation of the bank of which they were directors. Held, that the payee
was not a holder in due course, and the co-makers were entitled to a can-
cellation of the note.
2 AMr. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., suggests that uniformity and clarity might
be obtained by changing the opening clause of section 52 to read as fol-
lows: "A holder in due course is a payee or other holder who has taken,
etc." And also amending sub-section 4 of section 52 to read: "That at the
time he became a holder he had no notice of any infirmity in the instru-
ment or that the title of the person negotiating it was defective or that the
delivery to himself 'was wrongful." BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLM INSTRUDIENTS
LAW, ANN. (Chafee's 4th ed. 1926) 361.
The wording of this suggestion has been criticized, (1926) 36 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 158, at 159.
3India. The Negotiable Instruments Law of 1881 provides that
"'holder in due course' means any person who for consideration became
the possessor of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque if payable
to bearer, or the payee or indorsee thereof, if payable to, or the order of,
a payee, before the amount mentioned in it became payable, and without
having sufficient cause to believe that any defect existed in the title of
the person from whom he derived his title."
4 Aigler, Payees as Holders in Due Course (1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL ,
608.
For other discussions see (1898) 11 iHAnv. L. REV. 473; (1902) 15 ibid.
579; (1903) 16 ibid. 596; (1923) 36 ibid. 751; (1922) 1 Wis. L. REV. 421;
HENSiNG, The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (1911). 59 U. PA. L.
REv. 471; (1926) 74 ibid. 831; Feezer, May the Payee of a Negotiable In-
strument be a Holder in Due Course (1925) 9 MINN. L. REV. 101; (1924)
9 IowA L. Bull. 299; (1923) 18 ILL. L. REv. 47; (1922), 10 CALIF. L. RV.
413; (1922) 20 Micu. L. REv. 908; (1923) 21 ibid. 591; (1924) 22 ibid.
581; (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 227; (1915) 24 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 429;
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 119, 361.
5 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 631, says " . . .whether a payee is a
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have been filled in contrary to instructions.1 In such cases,
though the courts are about evenly divided, the payee has many
times been held to be a holder in due course.
II. In the case of a suit by the payee against an accommoda-
tion indorser, where delivery was made directly by the maker
to the payee, the question is raised in a somewhat different
manner." Courts saying that a payee cannot be a holder in due
course would seem to be required to hold that any defense such
as a fraud between the maker and indorser would be available
as a defense to the indorser.-" This would certainly appear to
be true if section 58, which provides specifically that "in the
hands of any holder other than a holder in due course, a nego-
tiable instrument is subject to the same defenses as if it were
non-negotiable," is applied. It is in situations of this sort,
however, that the desirability of recognizing the possibility of
a payee being a holder in due course is most apparent. And for
this purpose it would seem to be immaterial whether the payee
may be said to have taken as "purchaser" or as "promisee." 13
256 S. W. 434 (1923). Contra: Rice v. Jones, 102 Okla. 30, 225 Pac. 953
(1924). Cf. Builders' Lime & Cement Co. v. Weimer, 170 Iowa, 444, 151
N. W. 100 (1915).
30 Holding that the payee was a holder in due course: Simpson Y. Firt
Nat'l Bank, 94 Or. 147, 185 Pac. 913 (1919) ; see Boston Steel & Iron Co.
v. Stener, 183 Mlass. 140, 66 N. E. 646 (1903). Contra: Herdman v.
Wheeler, supra note 6; Vander Ploeg v. Van Zuuk, 135 Iowa, 330, 112 NT.
W. 807 (1907); Consolidated Wagon & Machine Co. v. Houseman, 038 Idaho,
343, 221 Pac. 143 (1923).
". Holding that the payee may be a holder in due course: McDonough v.
Cook, 19 Ont. L. Rep. 267 (1909) ; Knetchel Furniture Co. v. Ideal Furniture
Co., 19 Manitoba Rep. 652 (1910); Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, 191 Ala.
356, 67 So. 839 (1914) ; Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, 217 Mlass. 462, 105 N.
E. 605 (1914); Lowell v. Bickford, 201 lass. 543, 88 N. E. 1 (1909);
Johnston v. Knipe, 260 Pa. 504, 105 Atl. 705 (1918).
Contra: Southern Nat'1 Life Realty Co. v. People's Bank, 178 Ky. 80,
198 S. W. 543 (1917); Strother v. Wilkinson, 90 Okla. 247, 210 Pae. 41.G
(1923) ; Farmer's State Bank v. Mlowry, 107 0kla. 275, 2"32 Pac. 26 (1925) ;
Walker v. Traylor Engineering & Mlfg. Co., 12 Fed. (2) 382 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926); Howth v. Case Threshing Mlachine Co., 280 S. W. 238 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926).
Of course, if section 29 is to be interpreted as allowing a recovery against
an accommodation indorser by a holder for value, whether or not a holder
in due course, the question is not raised. This is not a desirable interpreta-
tion, however, and the farthest that any court has gone is to allow a holder
for value to recover where the instrument was taken after maturity but in
good faith. Marling v. Jones, 138 Wis. 82, 119 N. W. 931 (1009). See
also (1926) 24 MIicH. L. REV. 847.
32 See the cases cited supra in the second paragraph of note 11.
13 It might be contended that in suits against indorsers and sureties courts
allowing the payee to recover could reach that conclusion by applying con-
tract law. Thus where the payee has given a new consideration for the
instrument, a failure of consideration between maker and indorser, or some
other fraud by the principal maker against the indorser, where done with-
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tration of the "purchaser" case is where the paper, for example,
a bank draft, has been purchased by a third party and then
delivered to the payee. A payee taking from the drawer or
maker or agent of either is regarded as a "promisee." If the
act is to be amended to resolve the present conflict in decision,
it is important to consider whether it would be desirable to
continue this distinction. Granting that the distinction has some
historical basis," it does not appear to have been entirely satis-
factory, for "in a considerable number of cases" the payee has
been treated as a holder in due course, "though the payee dealt
directly with the promisors." 7
Instances where the courts have had occasion to determine
whether payees who might be said to have taken as "promisees"
rather than as "purchasers" should be treated as holders in due
course are numerous. Those in which the question becomes im-
portant may, however, be divided into four type situations.
I. As between maker and payee alone, (that is, where no
other parties are concerned) it is fairly obvious that the ques-
tion is usually of little importance because defenses, as for exam-
ple that of failure of consideration, may be interposed. Even
here, however, the possibility of a payee being a holder in due
course may be important.8 The principal cases raising the ques-
tion have been those where there has been some alteration in the
instrument before delivery," or where blanks in the instrument
holder in due course is a question not susceptible of a categorical answer.
In each instance the conclusion should depend upon the type of situation
presented. No doubt, prima facie, a payee is not a holder in due course
because presumptively he took the instrument as promisee rather than as
purchaser. But it always should be open to proof that he really acquired
the paper in the latter capacity, in which event, his status may be that of
a due course holder."
The writer states that an opposite conclusion as to the prima facie status
of the payee is reached by many of the courts and text writers, who argue
that since by section 191, a "holder means the payee or indorsee of a bill
or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof," and by section
59, "every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due course . . .";
that the payee, therefore, is prima facie a holder in due course. See Colon-
ial Fur Ranching Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 227 Mass. 12, 116 N. E. 731
(1917); McLaughlin v. Paine Furniture Co., 245 Mass. 377, 139 N. E. 542
(1923).
6 Munroe v. Bordier, 8 C. B. 862 (1849); Poirier v. Morris, 2 El. & B1. 89
(1853); Watson v. Russell, 3 B. & S. 33 (1862); Lewis v. Clay, 67 L. J.
Q. B. 224 (1898); Herdman v. Wheeler, 1 K. B. 361 (1902).
7 Aigler, op. cit. supra note 4, at 629.
8 If the payee may not be a holder in due course, section 28 reading that
"absence or failure of consideration is matter of defence as against any
person not a holder in due course . . ." might be applied with some pro-
priety as stating a rule regarding burden of proof. See (1925) 35 YALU
LAW JOURNAL, 369.
9 Holding that the payee was a holder in due course: Thorpe v. White,
188 Mass. 333, 74 N. E. 592 (1905); Snyder v. McEwen, 148 Tenn. 423,
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III. There are many cases involving co-makers, one of whom
has delivered the instrument to the payee contrary to the instruc-
tions of some one or more of the others, but nevertheless where
the payee has taken in good faith and for value.1  Foster v.
Security Bank & Trust Co.25 affords a good example of this
type as here one signer delivered the instrument in violation of
the understanding of the others. The instrument was complete
and regular and was taken in good faith and for value before
maturity. Of course the payee may be said in a sense to be a
"promisee" not only of the party delivering the instrument but
of the other makers as well. Conceivably the courts might adopt
the theory that the delivering signer appeared to be owner so
that, as to the defrauded signers, the payee would be a "pur-
chaser," or that the delivering signer acted within his apparent
authority although contrary to instructions. But whatever ra-
tionalization be indulged in, the important consideration, it is
submitted, is the conimnerdial desirability that defenses between
co-makers should be cut off not only as against indorsees but
also as against payees taking in good faith and for value.16
out the knowledge of the payee, should be no defense whether he were
considered a holder in due course or not. For this type of situation, see
Knetchel Furniture Co. v. Ideal Furniture Co., svpra note 11; Ex Parte
Goldberg & Lewis, supra note 11; Liberty Trust Co. v. Tilton, su'pra note 11.
But where no new consideration is advanced for the note, and it is given,
for example, for a pre-e.xisting debt, it is essential that the payee be con-
sidered a holder in due course to protect him against defenses between
maker and surety or indorser. Lowell v. Bickford, supra note 11; John-
ston v. Knipe, supra note 11.
14 Holding that the payee may be a holder in due course: Ford v. Shapiro,
207 Mass. 108, 92 N. E. 1029 (1910); lerchant's Nat'l Bank v. Smith, 59
Mont. 280, 196 Pac. 523 (1921) ; American Nat'l Bank v. Kerley, 109 Or.
155, 220 Pac. 116 (1923). Contra: Long v. Shafer, 185 Mo. App. 641, 171
S. W. 690 (1914).
'I Supra note 1.
26 Several of the courts have found difficulty in protecting the rights of
accommodation makers and indorsers when the payee either extends the
time of payment without the consent of the accommodation maker or dis-
charges collateral security without the knowledge or consent of the ac-
commodation maker or indorser. Confronted with the provisions of sec-
tions 119 and 120 of the N. 1. L., the former of which does not provide for
discharge of those primarily liable by extension of time or by release of
collateral security, and the latter of which does not provide for discharge
of those secondarily liable where there is a release of collateral security, a
few courts have avoided the difficulty by holding that a payee was not a
holder in due course, hence, by section 58, the instrument was subject to all
defenses the same as if it were non-negotiable, so that resort to sections
119 or 120 was unnecessary, as the ordinary rules of contract or suretyship
law could be applied. Southern Nat'l Life Realty Co. v. People's Banh,
supra note 11; Strother v. Wilkinson, supra note 11; Howth v. Case
Threshing Machine Co., supra note 11; Long v. Shafer, siupsa note 14. It
would be preferable to treat the payee as capable of being a holder in due




IV. The courts have had no difficulty, apparently, in giving
the payee the status of holder in due course for purposes of
suit against the acceptor."7 Yet if a payee cannot be a holder
in due course it would follow logically, under the Negotiable In-
struments Law, that defenses between drawer and drawee could
be interposed just as if the instrument were non-negotiable.
There is nothing in the statutory contract of the acceptor which
would avoid this result. 18 The acceptor, just as does the maker, io
engages that he will pay according to tenor. True, the acceptor
admits in addition the drawer's power of drawing, but it is
well settled that notvithstanding this, a payee taking in fraud
or after maturity, so as not to be a holder in due course for
these reasons, cannot recover in the face of defenses on the
part of the acceptor.20  Apparently the rule, before the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, was so well settled on this point that,
whatever the inconsistency with other holdings, it will never
be disturbed.
With these situations to be considered, the question resolves
itself into one of policy, with three main courses open. One is
to deny the possibility of a payee being given the status of holder
in due course; the second is to distinguish between whether the
payee is a "promisee" or "purchaser"; and the third to accord
to the payee in all cases as much protection as any other taker
of a negotiable instrument in good faith and for value. Courts
interpreting the statute so as to adopt the first course appear
to have a notion that "negotiation" must relate only to subse-
quent transfers of an instrument. 21 To say that this is neces-
' 7 Jarvis v. Wilson, 46 Conn. 90 (1878); Bergstrom v. Ritz-Carlton Co.,
171 App. Div. '776, 157 N. Y. Supp. 959 (19.16); Carnegie Trust Co. v. First
Nat'l Bank, 213 N. Y. 301, 107 N. E. 693 (1915).
18 By section 62 of the N. I. L., "The acceptor by accepting the instrument
engages that he will pay it according to the tenor of his acceptance; and
admits:
1. The existence of the drawer, the genuineness of his signature, and
his capacity and authority to draw the instrument, and
2. The existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse."
19 Section 60 of the N. I. L. provides that "The maker of a negotiable in-
strument by making it engages that he will pay it according to its tenor,
and admits the existence of the payee and his then capacity to indorse."
20 See Hill v. First Nat'l Bank, 129 Ark. 265, 195 S. W. 678 (1917).
22 The argument is presented in this fashion in Foster v. Security Bank
& Trust Co., supra note 1: "The reason for the doctrine of protection of
a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is the favor which the
law puts upon such commercial transactions to facilitate confidence in com-
mercial paper and to expedite transfers thereof free from hidden infirmities.
It is an aid to a transfer of a completed instrument, and has nothing to do
with the issuance and completeness of such instrument. Until there has
been a complete issuance there is nothing, as between the immediate parties,




sarily true because the instrument has not been "issued" and
so has not become part of the exchangeable currency of the
country available for purchase is merely to assume the result.
"Holder in due course" as used in the Act may be regarded as
being merely a symbol which may by legislative act, if not by
decision, be given what content is shown to be desirable. The
character of the opinions following the first course, taken with
the fact that so many cases hold that at least in some situations
a payee may be treated as a holder in due course, indicates that
there is little opinion in favor of, or reason for, denying the pos-
sibility of a payee being given such a status.
The second course would adopt the suggestion that a payee
should be treated as a holder in due course when the instrument
was taken from a so-called "remitter," but not when taken from
an agent of the drawer or maker.22 The distinction made in
this suggestion applies, if at all, only in cases where the deliv-
This reasoning clearly does not apply in the case of payee versus acceptor,
nor does it seem desirable in the case of payee versus co-maker or irregu-
lar indorser. As to such parties, if it is necessary to indulge in a fiction,
it seems only fair to hold that the case is the same as though the instru-
ment were signed by the indorser or co-maker to the order of the delivering
party and by him indorsed to the creditor (payee). Howard Nat'l Bank
v. Wilson, 96 Vt. 438, 120 Atl. 889 (1923). The case then falls squarely
within the orthodox statement of policy. But even without this, one major
item of policy is served by the increase of "confidence in commercial paper"
which would come by recognizing that a payee may be a holder in due
course.
22 Moore, The Right of the Remitter of a Bill or Note (1920) 20 CoL. L.
REV. 749, at 758. The distinction is supported on the ground that the pro-
tection of the innocent purchaser depends on the ownership or apparent
ownership of the third party. The case is limited to what is described as
true "remittable" paper, such as bills of exchange and bank drafts, and
would exclude checks, since a third person offering the latter to the payee
"commonly is and always offers the appearance of being the agent for the
drawer." But in a number of cases the payee of a check was considered
a holder in due course. Watson v. Russell, supra note G; Boston Steel
& Iron Co. v. Steuer, supra note 10; Nat'l Investment Co. v. Corey, 222
Mass. 453, 111 N. E. 357 (1916) ; Colonial Fur Ranching Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank, supra note 5; Bergstrom v. Ritz Carlton Co., supra note 17; Drumm
Const. Co. v. Forbes, 305 Ill. 303, 137 N. E. 225 (1922); McLaughlin v.
Paine Furniture Co., supra note 5. Professor Moore explains these cases
on the ground that the courts overlooked the fact that checks are not habit-
ually remitted, and says that if they were, the decisions would be correct.
Yet of the cases decided after the adoption of the N. I. L. cited by Profeszor
Moore in support of his view, two of them, Hathaway v. County of Dela-
ware, 185 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 153 (1906) and Apostoloff v. Levy, IS3 App.
Div. 767, 174 N. Y. Supp. 828 (1919), make no mention of the N. I. L. and
are decided on their peculiar facts which were such that the payees could
not have taken in good faith without further inquiry; and the third, Bowles
Co. v. Fraser, 59 Wash. 336, 109 Pac. 812 (1910) was decided at a time
when Washington was holding that in any case a payee could not be a
holder in due course.
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ery was made by an unauthorized agent, and in such case it
should not be necessary to say that the payee cannot be a holder
,in due course but only that in the particular case he was not
such a holder.23  The situation, however, involves conflicting
principles: that the maker should not be bound if his agent
exceeded his actual and apparent authority and, on the other
hand, that a bona fide taker of a negotiable instrument is to be
given special protection. The identical problem, moreover, may
be presented whenever a specially indorsed instrument is de-
livered to the indorsee by the agent of the indorser in violation
of instructions, 4 so it obviously does not require holding, where
delivery is made to the payee by an agent of the maker, that the
payee can not be regarded as a holder in due course.
It is believed that the wisest course would be to place the
payee on the same footing as any other taker of a negotiable
instrument. As pointed out in situation I, this would not allow
recovery as against maker or drawer where there had been a
failure of consideration or a taking in bad faith. But it would
allow recovery against a co-maker, accommodation indorser and
acceptor where such defenses by maker or drawer do not exist
23 In a case where the instrument was stolen from the drawer and pre-
sented to the payee by the thief who represented himself as the agent of the
drawer, it was held that the payee could not recover. Empire Trust Co. v.
Manhattan Co., 97 Misc. 694, 162 N. Y. Supp. 629 (1916).
The question of whether a payee may be a holder in due course under
the N. I. L. has not yet been decided by the New York Court of Appeals.
24 There seems to be no authority as to when and under what circum-
stances an indorsee may be a holder in due course, where the payee has
specially indorsed the instrument and given it to an agent who delivers it
to the indorsee for the use and benefit of his principal, but in excess of his
authority. However, when a payee indorses the instrument in blank and
delivers it to his agent who delivers it to the indorsee in violation of his
instructions, either for his own benefit or for the benefit of his principal,
it has been held that the indorsee is a holder in due course without inquir-
ing as to the scope of the agent's authority. Wedge Mines Co. v. Denver
Nat'l Bank, 19 Col. App. 182, 73 Pac. 873 (1903). See JoYcE, DEFENSES TO
COMMERCIAI" PAPER (1907) § 121 and cases cited. This result is reached
because the agent is considered as the apparent owner of the instrument
indorsed in blank. On the other hand, when an agent, trustee, or officer
of a corporation, in violation of his authority, indorses the instrument and
applies the same to his own indebtedness, the indorsee is held to be under
a duty to ascertain the extent of his authority. Ward v. City Trust Co.,
192 N. Y. 61, 84 N. E. 585 (1908); Fisk Rubber Co. v. Pinkey, 100 Wash.
220, 170 Pac. 581 (1918); Bank of Benson v. Gordon, 103 Neb. 508, 172
N. W. 367 (1919); Jenkins v. Planter's Bank, 34 Okla. 607, 126 Pac. 757
(1912). From these two extreme rules might be drawn a modification ap-
plicable to the situation first above mentioned. Section 16 requires that
"as between immediate parties . . . the delivery, in order to be effectual,
must be made either by or under the authority of the party . . . indorsing."
The finding of apparent authority may well be influenced in a particular
case by the taking in "good faith."
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and defenses between such parties and the drawer or maker are
sought to be interposed. It is just tds protection which the
payee believes that he has acquired when he takes a negotiable
instrument.
The "remitter" situation presents an additional factor, that
is, protection from defenses between drawer or maker and "re-
mitter." The situation was well exemplified by the case of Jonzcs,
Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd.22 The decision might be sus-
tained legalistically by saying that checks are not "remittable"
paper, interjecting an arbitrary distinction on which, however,
it would be hard to reach unanimity of opinion.2° It was put,
however, on the bare ground that under the Bills of Exchange
Act the payee of an order instrument cannot be a holder in due
course. If the general possibility of a payee being a holder in
due course is recognized, it may perhaps be unnecessary to give
attention to this special situation.
Moreover, the adoption of the third course would bring the
payee question into harmony with two other situations arising
under the Negotiable Instruments Law, which must be consid-
ered. Ordinarily the maker or drawer makes the instrument
payable directly to the order of the payee. But the maker or
drawer might evidence his obligation by making it payable to
himself and indorsing it to his creditor, the erstwhile payee. In
this case, it never has been contended, apparently, that the cred-
itor could not be a holder in due course.2 7 The result is reached
without resort to a "remitter" doctrine. And obviously the cred-
itor is really no more a "purchaser" than if he had been named
as payee. Again, the instrument may be drawn payable to
bearer. In this case, too, the creditor would seem to satisfy
the requirements of section 30 requiring only "delivery" to con-
stitute "negotiation" of a bearer instrument and so might be con-
25 Supra note 1.
26 See the article by Feezer, op. cit. szpra note 4, at 104, n. 13. The
writer argues that the interest of the payee should not depend merely
upon the type of instrument he uses, and points out that not only in the case
of checks, but promissory notes, too, payees have been treated as holders in
due course. Ex parte Goldberg & Lewis, supra note 11; Liberty Trust Co.
v. Tilton, supra note 11.
27 Exchange Bank v. Beckwith, 37 Ga. App. 729, 124 S. E. 542 (1924);
Public Bank of New York City v. Knox-Burchard Mercantile Co., 135 Blinn.
171, 160 N. W. 667 (1916); Merritt v. Duncan, 54 Tenn. 15G (1872). Cf.
Vogel v. Pyne, 197 -App. Div. 633, 189 N. Y. Supp. 285 (1921). But cf.
Little v. Rogers, 1 Metc. 108 (Mass. 1840).
The question of whether a payee may be a holder in due course appar-
ently has not yet arisen in the highest courts of Georgia and Minnesota,
although in the latter state, it was assumed in State Bank v. Missia, 144
Minn. 410, 175 N. W. 614 (1920), that a payee might be a holder in due




sidered a holder in due course.28 While matters of form are of
importance in many cases, it does not seem that this distinction
is understood in the business world, if indeed it is established as
a matter of law, nor does there seem to be any point in recogniz-
ing it by legislation. On the contrary, it would be better to
provide that the first taker of a negotiable instrument, whether
he be payee, bearer or indorsee, is as much entitled to be given
the status of holder in due course as is any other taker.
In those jurisdictions which have not recognized the possi-
bility of a payee being a holder in due course, either section 52
or section 30 should be modified. It is submitted that, by amend-
ing only the latter portion of section 30, the section defining
negotiation, to read, "if payable to order it is negotiated to the
payee by delivery or to a subsequent party by the indorsement
of the holder completed by delivery," 29 all points could be satis-
factorily covered.
28 Butsee dictum in Foster v. Security Bank and Trust Co., supra note 1
reading as follows:
"In the act of negotiation there must be a transferer and a transferee.
There must of necessity* be an 'instrument' the subject matter of the trans-
fer. This instrument must be owned by the transferor, whose title at
least must not have been known to the transferee as having any infirmity.
In other words, the subject of the transfer must be an instrument with all
the elements of completeness in form and other requirements affecting the
validity of its issuance. It must have been at the time of the transfer a
negotiable instrument. It is suggested that the language 'if payable to
bearer it is negbtiated by delivery,' supports the view that a delivery to the
payee is a negotiation of the instrument. But not so at all. The act is
speaking of completed instruments-delivered instruments."
29 (1926) 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 158, at 160.
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